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‘Shoot the Boer’ – Hate Speech, Law and the Expediency of Sound
Abstract
In recent years, “Shoot the Boer” (“Dubul’ ibhunu”), a well-known protest song from the apartheid era,
experienced an unexpected revival in the streets of South Africa—and the courts. The article traces the
history of the intersection of the song and the law as it meandered through an intricate topography of
cases, rules and regulations ranging from the common-law crime of high treason, apartheid “antiterrorism” and “anti-communism” law, post-apartheid constitutional law and the Broadcasting Code of
Conduct. In contrast to established judicial practice where hate speech is reduced to its verbal dimension
and sound serves as an expedient and abject to be invoked and discarded at will, the article focuses on
sound as an equally pertinent criterion for regulating expressions such as “Shoot the Boer.”
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‘Shoot the Boer’ – Hate Speech, Law
and the Expediency of Sound
Veit Erlmann
On March 26, 2010, a defiant Julius Malema, then president of
the ANC Youth League, the youth wing of South Africa’s former
liberation movement and current governing party ANC (African
National Congress), stepped out of the building of the South Gauteng
( Johannesburg) High Court to address a throng of his supporters.
They had assembled to protest the charges that were brought against
him for having sung a song: ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ (Shoot the Boer). Under
subsection 1 of s 16 of the South African Constitution, the indictment
stated, Malema’s right to freedom of expression did not extend to
‘a. propaganda for war; b. incitement of imminent violence; or c.
advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion,
and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.’ Surrounded by Nelson
Mandela’s ex-spouse Winnie Madikizela Mandela and other ANC
officials, Malema urged the crowd to respect the court proceedings: ‘As
we march here outside, demonstrate, protest in support of our songs,
we must be disciplined.’ And in a demonstration of just what he meant
by respect and discipline, he launched – yet again - into a rousing
rendering of ‘Dubul’ ibhunu.’ But instead of singing ‘kill the Boer,’ he
changed the lyrics to ‘kiss the Boer.’
In this paper I follow the song as it meandered through an
intricate topography of cases, rules and regulations ranging from the
common-law crime of high treason, apartheid “anti-terrorism” and
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“anti-communism” law, post-apartheid constitutional law and the
Broadcasting Code of Conduct. Yet despite the stark contrast between
these doctrines and the wider historical and political circumstances in
which ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ figured there is one constant that unites the legal
construction of the song: the absence of sound. The article is divided
into six sections. I begin with a relatively lengthy discussion of the
key claims and concepts guiding the inquiry. In the second part of the
article I move on to examine one of the key trials of the late apartheid
period in which eleven leaders of the ANC-led alliance called United
Democratic Front (UDF) were charged with high treason for having
given speeches and having sung ‘revolutionary’ songs - including
‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ – in order to incite to acts of treason, violence, and
‘dissent between races’ (S v Ramgobin & others 1985 (3) SA 587 (N),
Indictment). This will be followed in the third and fourth parts by a
discussion of Malema’s brush with the law over the public performance
of the song in 2011. In the fifth part I discuss a hearing that was held
in the summer of 2017 at the Broadcasting Complaints Commission
of South Africa (BCCSA) over an episode in the wildly popular soap
Isidingo depicting a particularly graphic example of hate speech and
attempted murder, complete with a lynch mob intoning ‘Dubul’ ibhunu.’
(The discussion of the first case is based on my having served as a witness
for the defense and on recently discovered court papers of that trial.
For the BCCSA case I rely on my role as a participant observer of the
hearing.) I close with some preliminary thoughts on how attempts at
countering hate speech in music and other creative practices may not
only end up regenerating the politics of hate but also undermine the
possibility of a critique of hate and violence that goes beyond liberal
visions of an ideal public sphere and constitutional constraints on the
freedom of expression.
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1
In his groundbreaking book Acoustic Jurisprudence. Listening to the Trial
of Simon Bikindi, which examines the role of sound and music in the
trial of the popular singer Simon Bikindi and his role in the 1994
Rwanda genocide, James Parker states that law is ‘never without the
problem of sound.’ (2015: 2) The ‘problem,’ he elaborates, is nowhere
more apparent than in the attention given to the voice in judicial
speech. Thus, on the one hand the Bikindi court reproduced some
of the most entrenched (Western) stereotypes of the voice as the
medium par excellence of logos and, hence, as the crucial mechanism
through which the Tribunal secured the connection – the ‘expressive
chain’ – between Bikindi’s genocidal intent, his words and the listeners
who tuned into radio RTLM’s non-stop Tutsi-baiting and Bikindi’s
songs (Parker 2015: 118). But on the other hand, it was through a
‘sophisticated rhetorical, grammatological and, moreover, specifically
jurisprudential technique’ that the acoustic qualities of the voice were
left unsaid (ibid: 122). In other words: ‘in the process of ‘giving voice’
to speech, the [Bikindi] Tribunal did as much as it could to quieten it.’
(ibid: 123) This paradox haunts the project of an acoustic jurisprudence,
compelling scholars to engage in two mutually dependent exercises:
to ‘think sonically’ (ibid: 212) by uncovering a previously unheard
dimension of legal thought and practice, and conversely, to ‘listen
jurisprudentially’ by ‘attending to the peculiar dilemmas and techniques
of legal judgment.’ (ibid: 213)
In what follows I want to amplify Parker’s argument by suggesting
that the precarious entanglement of sonic presences and absences
constitutes law’s very condition of possibility. Law’s ‘problem,’ then, is
not owed to the exclusion of sound from legal discourse or to a lack of
aural sensibility. Nor is it resolved solely by gestures of interdisciplinary
reciprocity. What do I mean by this? Earlier, in a contribution to Sound
Objects, a collection of essays edited by Ray Chow and James Steintrager,
I invoked Julia Kristeva’s work on abjection to highlight this enabling
rather than diminishing function of law’s sonic indetermination
(Erlmann 2019, Kristeva 1982). ‘Sound,’ I argued there, may function
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as what she called an ‘abject,’ a phenomenon whose conceptual and
perceptual instability is a necessary condition of the subject’s desire
for identity by maintaining a firm separation between self and other.
Kristeva’s concept was attractive as an analytical category because it
seemed to offer an alternative to Freud’s views on repression as resulting
from a subject’s desire for a forbidden object. For Kristeva, it is the
antecedent ambiguity of the subject-object relation itself that is being
repressed. Hence, the return of repressed things like uncontrollable
body fluids does not recall specific traumas as much as it evokes the
fragility of the borders separating the inside from the outside. And it
is these unstable boundaries that form the space proper of the abject.

Building on this premise, it seemed to make sense to examine
the intersection of the sonic abject with a range of theorisations of
voice, speech and language such as Shoshana Felman’s ‘scandalous’
speech act (Felman 1983); Kristeva’s work on poetic language and
the preverbal, ‘rhythmic’ chora; Judith Butler’s theory of hate speech
and the ‘incongruity of the speaking body’ that remains ‘uncontained
by any of its speech acts,’ (1997:155); and crucially, with more recent
developments in the burgeoning field of sound studies centered on
the ‘ontology of sound’ and sound as an object. As my earlier article,
however, did not progress beyond some rather preliminary thoughts,
I wish to widen the scope of this inquiry by taking the argument into
a slightly different direction. Rather than presuming the abjection of
sound to be a priori of securing law’s self-identity, I am approaching
the sonic abject from its opposite or, if you will, from the subjectpoint of Kristeva’s subject-object-abject triad by attending to law’s
instability, tentativeness, limits and failures in asserting its authority
over sound. In other words, instead of conceiving of abjection as a
preexisting condition for the law, I stress the contingent, incomplete,
even capricious nature of legal strategies of sonic abjection in dealing
with the notorious difficulties created by hate speech. Or, following
Stanley Fish’s controversial essay ‘The Law Wishes to Have a Formal
Existence,’ I see law as ‘continually creating and recreating itself out
of the very materials and forces it is obliged, by the very desire to be
law, to push away’ (Fish 1999: 181).
277

Veit Erlmann

I call this self-reproduction of the law out of the abjection of sound
the expediency of sound. However, in contrast to the conventional
association with unscrupulous self-gratification, and opportunistic
political maneuvering or just plain usefulness, the way I deploy the term
is inspired by its more neglected etymological roots. More than a mere
rhetorical device or means toward an end, it is the ordering function of
sound that I highlight. As an expedient, sound allows the law to put its
house in order and to represent law to itself. In other words, it is “good
to think with.” Consequently, in the sections that follow I focus less on
the doctrinal aspects or justifications of hate speech regulation and more
on the procedural and probative work the abjection of sound actually
does in different judicial contexts. But before I enter into a detailed
analysis of this work, I need to introduce three additional concepts.

The first concept, agency, has competing meanings in legal discourse
and critical, post-structuralist scholarship. In commercial law, for
instance, agency refers to contractual and non-contractual relationships
between a principal and an agent who acts on the authority – whether
express, implied or apparent – of the former. In the context of criminal
and international criminal law, the term refers to the ‘innocent agency’
in a criminal act that is committed by an agent who himself may not
have mens rea or the capacity to commit a crime. The point that interests
me most about these forms of agency is their mediating quality. Agency
here is not inherent in only one actor, but a function of relationships
in which several actors are entangled at different levels of liability.
By contrast, there does not appear to be a corresponding concept of
responsibility in either Felman’s, Kristeva’s or Butler’s work. A subject
whose speech always and already is but one link in an endless chain of
repeatable enunciations beyond her control cannot be said to exercise
the absolute agency of the autonomous, self-possessing individual
imagined by law. Yet, by the same token, agency cannot be delegated to
a surrogate agent who might be held accountable because of the alleged
proximity of her speech act to an effect. Agency and responsibility, in
critical theory, can never be traced to an original moment; they are
always deferred indefinitely.
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Butler did, however, elaborate an alternative concept of agency, one
that may prove useful in securing a more prominent position of sound
in legal discourse. In a series of by now canonical formulations, she
has suggested that by uncoupling the speech act from the sovereign
subject, agency may be rethought in novel ways: ‘agency begins where
sovereignty wanes’ (Butler 1997: 15-16). By this she means that rather
than demolishing agency, the critique of the ‘conceit’ of sovereignty
opens up the possibility for a new sense of agency to emerge. Not only
does this agency more fully acknowledge the constitution of the subject
in language in general and its subjugation in hate speech in particular, it
may also enhance our responsibility for that speech. The responsibility
of the one who utters hate speech consists of ‘negotiating the legacies
of usage that constrain and enable that speaker’s speech’ (ibid: 27). But
at the same time this responsibility – ‘afflicted with impurity from the
start’ – also puts the speaking subject in an ethical bind, one in which
the question of how best to use speech is unanswerable without prior
consideration being given to the fundamental aporia between language
as exceeding the speaking subject on the one hand and this very ‘excess’
making possible the speech of the subject on the other hand (ibid: 28).
Of course, for Butler that antinomy can no more be dissolved by fiat
than agency simply follows from a sovereign will. In fact, there is not
only no escape from the dilemma of the concurrently subject-exceeding
and speech-enabling language, its very existence is the condition of
possibility for confronting hate speech. The counter-appropriation
of injurious speech for Butler is therefore squarely located in the
intersection of the semiotic and the social, in practices of resignification
and recontextualisation. Ironically, it is this theory of linguistic agency
that also puts her argument in close proximity to the very push for legal
remedy against hate speech that she otherwise laments. As we will see in
the discussion of the case against Malema mentioned at the beginning,
the court’s opinion, Malema’s shrewd rephrasing of the lyrics, and even
some of the criticism the case occasioned from proponents of critical
race theory, all in one way or another and for different ends deploy the
rhetoric of recontextualisation.

279

Veit Erlmann

The discrepancy between legal and critical understandings of agency
becomes perhaps even more pronounced when viewed in conjunction
with the debate about another key concept: the harm in hate speech.
Although it may be a uniquely American preoccupation (albeit one
with growing import for liberal democracies elsewhere that are getting
swept up in the resurgence of populism and extremism) situated within
the controversy about the pros and cons of free speech protections,
some of the points in this debate may be relevant for the topic at hand
(Delgado-Stefancic 2019, Fish 1995, Heinze 2016, Strossen 2018,
Matsuda et al 2019, Sorial 2012). There are two, sharply contrasting
viewpoints. According to the first, pro-protection position, hate speech
is just an expression like any other and therefore protected under the
First Amendment. Implicit in this argument is the notion that the
precise nature of the harm and its relationship to an offensive expression
cannot always be unequivocally determined. But in a contrary, proregulation perspective, that relation is much more straightforward. At
issue here is not the causal relation between expressions of hate and
its purported effects as much as the speech itself that might constitute
the harm. On this view, hate speech would thus have to be viewed as
a form of conduct or a performative act and the harm associated with
this act-like speech as being integral to its very existence as hate speech
(Waldron 2012).

The latter paradigm entails important implications. Because hate
speech might be construed as equivalent to an assault and, hence,
the harm inherent in it as being prima facie evident, there would
hardly have to be any reason to produce compelling evidence about
the precise nature of the harm. Furthermore, the notion that the
harm of hate speech is figured as inextricably interwoven with the
‘content’ of the hate speech and that therefore any injurious effect is
necessarily traceable to speech, dispenses with the need of considering
any situational context such as the person of the speaker or the
role of the listener and their potentially uneven positions of power.
This, obviously, would not only have broader political implications
beyond evidentiary constraints such as complicating any attempt at
distinguishing between radical but otherwise protectable political
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enunciations and direct incitements to violence. It might also have the
undesired effect of disseminating or, to use one of the key terms Butler
invokes in arguing against censorship, ‘repeating’ elements of the very
hate speech that legal interventions are called upon to suppress in the
first place. Likewise, by foreclosing the ‘gap’ between speech and its
effects, the constitutive theory of hate speech might embolden forms
of state intervention that stifle ‘nonjuridical forms of opposition, ways
of restaging and resignifying speech in contexts that exceed those
determined by the courts’ (Butler 1997: 23).1

Without a doubt, despite numerous question marks and the rich
potential for divergent interpretations (known to every philosopher and
student of the law trying to argue their way around First Amendment
absolutism), these interventions offer suggestive leads for crafting
a theory of sound as a legal expedient. At the same time, they are
noteworthy for their utter silence on the place of sound in injurious
speech. For even where Felman, Kristeva and Butler and others
occasionally stray into the physicality of the voice – the breath, vocal
cords, glottis and the resonant spaces of the mouth – they tend to do
so by summarily substituting the voice for the sound it generates. The
question thus remains as to the logic by which sound may be producing
harmful effects. Is it in the form of what John L.Austin (1962) termed
perlocution or is, alternatively, sound a type of illocution and, thus,
the injury itself?

This is also the question that preoccupies a strand of theory that
operates under the label ‘ontology’ and here especially a variant within
sound studies that seems to be fixated on the ‘object sound.’ One of the
most influential statements to date of this trend is Steve Goodman’s
(2010) book Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect, and the Ecology of Fear. 2
Everything in Goodman’s ‘ecology of fear’ is alive with vibration. It is
through the visceral effect of vibration, he argues, that sound acts on
bodies. But in so doing, vibration always precedes consciousness and
signification by a split second. Thus detached from the possibility of
any cognitive response, this ‘vibrational force’ becomes a key vehicle
of contemporary forms of power to reproduce themselves by arousing a
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diffuse array of primal affects such as fear. So far Goodman’s argument
appears to extend to sound Butler’s concept of language as the condition
of possibility for the (speaking) subject, as that which ‘precedes and
exceeds the subject’ (Butler 1997: 28). And, like Butler, Goodman
is interested in developing alternative strategies for the formation
of oppositional subjectivities. Yet unlike Butler and echoing Brian
Massumi (2002), such strategies cannot be based in any rationally
guided, non-affective responses such as the first’s highly self-aware
‘re-signifying.’ Power can only be resisted by what Goodman calls a
‘politics of frequency,’ through an experimental aesthetics and practice
such as Afrofuturism or electronic dance music (both of which also
inform Goodman’s own work as a DJ) that transduce ‘bad vibes into
something more constructive’ (2010: 73).
In response to the latter point, Brian Kane, possibly sound
ontology’s most discerning critic, has pointed out that Goodman fails
to explain how a counter-hegemonic politics of frequency may be
substantiated merely by shifting from the ontologically antecedent,
fear-inducing vibrations to the decidedly more pleasurable sensations
produced by EDM (Kane 2015: 7). Rather what ensues from ontologies
such as Goodman’s is anything but counter-hegemonic: a concern with
boundaries. ‘Most ontological claims are less arguments than assertions
or commitments,’ Kane writes and, as such, these assertions serve to
stabilise claims where the conclusion is already predetermined and, in
this manner, ‘make legible the epistemic and axiological views of those
who do the positioning’ (2019: 67). The question then, Kane goes on to
argue, is not so much what this scholarship might tell us about the being
or mere thereness of sound but how the ontological reduction of sound
and the attendant ‘phantasmagoric occultation of production’ might
be countered by recognising sounds as ‘sedimentation of historical and
social forces’ (2019: 68).3
The words ‘sedimentation’ and ‘forces’ may be poorly chosen here,
for sound is being ossified as the product of a mechanism depriving
it of any agency of its own. But as Actor-Network Theory (ANT) has
taught us, history, culture, society, or nature are no more given ‘forces’
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or domains of reality than sound is an object. Rather, they are ways of
connecting disparate phenomena and consolidating them into more
or less durable entities that then become operational as ‘matters of
concern’ for different epistemological and practical interests (Latour
2005: 113). On this view, then, sound – physically and figuratively born
from friction – might more productively have to be understood not as
an object, medium, let alone as a subject. Rather I propose to consider
sound as a ‘mediator’ in the ANT sense of the term: as a somewhat
evanescent construct translating, transforming and modifying what it
is supposed to carry: language, music, and even the very meaning and
harm of hate (Latour 2005: 38).

But what, precisely, are the connections with the law sound might
afford and vice versa? What is it about sound’s promiscuity that renders
it so fundamentally incompatible with and yet at the same time useful
to the law? What would be the sonic, non-verbal equivalent of the harm
in hate speech? And how might Butler’s and Goodman’s conceptions
of creative anti-hegemonic agency square with some of the arguments
being proffered for and against the protection of hate speech? As the
discussion above has shown, ontological, that is, object and vibrationcentered theories of sound offer only scant guidance here. Attempting
to translate the logic of sonic ontology into a legal one about the
sonic harm in hate speech risks confounding the constitutive theory
of harm (whereby harm is inherent in the injurious speech) with a
consequentialist one according to which harm results from speech.

What then is the way out of this conundrum? Earlier I suggested
that we consider sound as an expedient allowing the law to do its
work. There is a fascinating counterpart to this hypothesis in what
anthropologist and legal scholar Annelise Riles (2005) calls law’s
‘technicalities.’ Over the years, Riles has made a compelling case
for a new kind of interdisciplinary relationship between law and the
humanities that eschews the instrumentalism of Legal Realism (in
which the legal provides the means toward extra-legal ends and the
humanities are called upon to examine both the ends and the failures
of the means-end rationale) in favor of a more nuanced approach
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inspired by Science and Technology Studies (STS) and ANT. For
instance, using the conflict of laws doctrine Riles argues that it is ‘the
mundane technocratic dimensions of law, precisely those dimensions
that fail to engage humanists’ theoretical, critical, or reformist passions,
that are the most interesting artifacts of lawyerly work,’ and as such
these dimensions are amenable to sophisticated cultural analysis (Riles
2005: 1029). However, in order to turn a new page in the humanistic
study of law, such cultural analysis would need to go beyond the
conventional wisdom of socio-legal studies or Critical Legal Studies
that legal form – much like law in toto – is but a ‘social construction’
or a consequence of wider ‘cultural’ trends. Form and technicality are
not effects or byproducts of more important agents and forces, Riles
argues, but the ‘protagonists of law’s own account’ (ibid: 975) In short,
the humanistic study of law has to ‘account for the agency of technocratic
legal form’ itself (ibid: 980).
Sound in hate speech cases, I suggest analogously, might be viewed
as yet another protagonist of law’s own account. As such it not only
allows the judicial process to move along toward resolution, it also
makes it possible to apprehend sound’s agency without ever leaving
the domain of the legal itself.
2
The first reported case in which ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ features is the so-called
Pietermaritzburg Treason Trial of 1985 (S v Ramgobin & others 1985
(3) SA 587 (N)). It was brought by the apartheid regime against the
leaders of the anti-apartheid umbrella organisation United Democratic
Front (UDF) on common-law charges of treason and a variety of
alternate charges based in apartheid legislation. The evidence presented
by the state almost in its entirety consisted of some 35 videotapes
(recorded by police and CNN) of what it called ‘bellicose’ speeches
and songs – including ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ – that were delivered during
UDF rallies. Although the trial eventually collapsed on procedural
and evidential grounds (inaccurate translations, tapes that had been
tempered with, and poor sound quality) and the state focused on the
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lyrics of these songs throughout, the arguments during pleadings are
instructive because they point toward some of the ambiguities of the
sonic abject and the expediency of sound that this essay is about.
From the outset, the defense honed in on the state’s inability to
prove that the videos were the direct result of these witnesses having
observed the accused initiating and participating in the singing and if
so, to what extent mens rea might be ascertained on this evidence. Here
are some typical examples from the further particulars illustrating the
defense’s strategy:
‘Is it alleged that each of the Accused heard and understood each of
the songs and slogans?’
Or:
‘Is it alleged that on each occasion specified in the relevant Schedule
the Accused whose name is stated as being present on the particular
occasion of the meeting concerned was also present when the song or
slogan was sung or uttered?’

In a similar vein, the following passages from the cross-examination
of one Izak Daniel de Vries, a self-styled expert of ‘revolution’ and one
of the state’s key witnesses, illustrate the defense’s attempt to counter the
charge of treason by undermining the idea that the mere performance
of certain songs reveals a ‘hostile intent’ to commit or incite to treason:
MR MAHOMED [counsel]: M’Lord, the only other observation,
I think, which might be relevant is that the singing we saw in the
beginning of that video appears to have been before the commencement
of the meeting itself. […]
MILNE, J P [judge]: Yes, we agree that that’s correct.
MR GEY VAN PITTIUS [prosecutor]: Well M’Lord, perhaps
I should add then, then of course after the meeting had finished,
then again the singing starts […] The observations that we need to
make, so it seems to me, are not very many in view of the fact that
the transcripts helpfully, in our view, purport to indicate not merely
speech but gestures, movement, singing, and so on […]
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MILNE, J P: Really perhaps one can clarify it by saying that the
singing […] actually appears to take place outside the hall in which
the meeting actually occurred.
MR MAHOMED: I’m quite happy as long as – I think it’s common
enough that the singing we see in the beginning of the video, whether
inside or outside the hall, is before the commencement of the meeting
itself. […]
MR MAHOMED: Because M’Lord, we will point out to Your
Lordship and submit in due course that that seems to be a recurring
thing which happens at all these meetings. The singing actually goes
on before the meeting starts and it’s a way in which the audience keeps
itself occupied.
Further on there is this exchange:
MR MAHOMED: People often enjoy themselves with song.
MILNE J P: Oh yes, certainly.
MR MAHOMED: And we will be actually having expert evidence if
we ever reach that stage, to say what the purpose of this sort of song is
in African tradition, but that there was a mood of anger, with respect,
is a correct observation.
MILNE, J P: Oh yes. That was the prevailing mood.
MR MAHOMED: Yes, but it ..(intervention)
MILNE, J P: I don’t mean it was continuous.
MR MAHOMED: Yes, it is intermittently interrupted by a lot of good
cheer and laughter and smiles as well, particularly during the singing.
I noticed on the face of the singers and the gumboot dancers and so
forth, there was a considerable merriment and enjoyment.
MILNE, J P: Yes, of course a lot of that was not observed by us because
it was agreed that it was not relevant and it was just — if I can use the
technical term – put on the fast-forward button. […]
MR MAHOMED: Yes, just to get the total picture M’Lord. One
perhaps looks at these people participating in these songs and it
undoubtedly serves a kind of entertainment and amusement value as
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well, regardless of the words, that one smiles oneself; one watches; one
is affected by the rhythm and the tempo and the beat and the melody.
So anger is true as a prevailing mood M’Lord, but it had these other
features as well.
MILNE, J P: Yes. Perhaps one could put it this way Mr Mahomed,
although we received the impression that that was the prevailing mood,
it’s not necessarily the continuous mood.

There are several aspects in these brief moments of wrangling over
the admissibility of evidence that require close reading. At the most
basic level of criminal procedure, the question about when and where
the singing took place and where the witnesses were during those
moments was not only directed at the potential for hearsay (which in
turn resulted in long hours being spent debating the reliability of the
recordings); it also enabled the defense to rebut the notion that the
accused acted with mens rea when they were not even present during
the singing and, hence, their liability as principals was all but certain.
By far the most noteworthy aspect of the cross-examination, however,
is the manner in which the defense time and again inserted sound
as an object of legal scrutiny in its own right. Invoking ‘song’ as a
placeholder for what in essence was a discussion about the audibility
of sound within a given time-space, the attorney adroitly redirected
the court’s attention from the accused’s individual actions toward a
more diffuse situation of collective responsibility. For instance, one of
the conditions of ‘hostile intent’ as the central element of the crime of
treason is that it consists of an ‘overt act’ aimed against the state, such
as organising an armed insurrection. But, in another sense, the overt
act may also be construed as being little more than a ‘manifestation’ of
hostile intent, such as in an individual writing, speaking and singing
words that as such do not incite others to treason.4 This possibility,
blatantly at odds with the definition of treason at common law, is the
reason why the defense sought to stress the ‘entertainment’ aspect of
the singing, at one point even hinting at the notion (which I had rather
frivolously recommended to counsel) that such collective ‘letting off
steam’ in song was rooted in African tradition and was meant to restore
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social harmony.

Another example of the drift toward sound may be seen in the
defense’s attempt to deflect attention from singing as intentional
utterance. By raising the question of the accused’s hearing, the defense
adroitly widens the interpretive frame by shifting the focus from the
intention of a singular speaking or singing subject toward a more
dialogic situation in which the mere fact of being within ear-shot of an
utterance proves culpability. Hearing others sing the allegedly ‘bellicose’
‘Dubul’ ibhunu,’ this line of reasoning seems to suggest, displaces the
accused from the position of a solitary, willfully speaking subject
‘inciting’ an amorphous crowd and ‘advocating’ a certain course of
action toward one of social embeddedness in which individual volition
and collective action are submerged in a heterogeneous sonosphere.
3
More than 30 years after the 1985 Treason Trial ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’
resurfaced in a totally different political and legal setting. In 2010
Afriforum, an organisation that describes itself as an NGO defending
the minority rights of Afrikaners (i.e. ‘Boers’) by demanding that
murders of white farmers be classified as racially motivated ‘genocide,’
filed a complaint against Malema with the South African Commission
on Human Rights for having publicly performed ‘Dubul ’ibhunu.’
While the Commission ruled that the phrase ‘Kill the Boer’ did not
qualify as hate speech but was simply an example of free expression, on
appeal the Equality Court of South Gauteng set aside that decision.
While Malema defended his actions by maintaining that the words
were intended to symbolise the destruction of white oppression (the
former regime) rather than to indicate the literal intention to shoot
the Boers, the court disagreed. Both the words and the ‘song,’ it
found, violated s 10 of the Equality Act which prohibits words that
‘demonstrate a clear intention to be (a) be hurtful; (b) be harmful or
to incite harm; (c) promote or propagate hatred’ and as such they did
not fall under s 16 of the Constitution that excludes hate speech from
protection (Afriforum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) SA
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240 (EqC) 20968/2010).

Afriforum has since become the subject of intense debate, as
evinced for instance by the cartoon below. Here South Africa’s leading
cartoonist Jonathan Shapiro (aka ‘Zapiro’), perhaps not very subtly,
depicts Malema on the left as he sings ‘Dubula’ and a high-ranking
member of the South African Police Service on the right orders a group
of officers to ‘shoot to kill.’ The difference between both ‘chants,’ Shapiro
seems to suggest, is the number of casualties (or absence thereof) they
are said to have caused.

Fig. 1 Two Buffoons Singing Their Chant © 2014 Zapiro. Originally
published on Daily Maverick. Re-published with permission - For more
Zapiro cartoons visit www.zapiro.com

Legal scholars for their part have attacked the Afriforum court for
failing to deal with, as Joel Modiri, drawing on core tenets of Critical
Race Theory, puts it ‘the ideological nature of law and the politics
of race in post-1994 South Africa’ (2013: 274).5 While Zapiro’s is a
consequentialist argument predicated on the ‘gap’ between speech and
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alleged harm, Modiri points to the jurisprudential flaws underpinning
that argument from the outset. In his decision, he writes, Lamont J
had refused to consider the ‘black point of view.’ Instead of a fair,
objective legal outcome, the judgment implicitly perpetuates entrenched
traditions of South African formalist legal reasoning and its equivalent
in the politics of liberal-democratic governance and race neutrality.
For instance, it is oblivious to the fact that in contexts of pervasive
and persistent racism the law is incapable of race-neutral application,
itself being the product of a racially defined political and economic
order. Furthermore, and most crucially for the question posed in this
paper, the Afriforum court operated on the basis of what Modiri calls
‘structural determinism’ in which the ‘structure of legal thought and
the prevailing legal culture determines its content and thus also who
benefits from it and whose interests and values it protects and reflects’
(Modiri 2013: 286). For instance, the unwavering belief in the precision
and self-revealingness of words and texts at the heart of legal thought
disregards the possibility of shifting intentionalities behind the singing
of ‘Dubula ‘ibhunu,’ such as reviving the legacy of ‘struggle songs;’ to
legitimise Malema’s claims to leadership by connecting current conflicts
to the morally justified anti-apartheid struggle; or, to use the song as
a non-violent expression of ‘disciplined’ dissent.

Modiri’s critique and the intellectual environment that nourishes
it deserves more attention than I can offer in this essay.6 Instead, I am
limiting my observations to one point; to the fact namely that he –
and other critics of Afriforum and the regulation of hate speech more
broadly – neglect to consider the judge’s explicit inclusion of ‘song’
as a category of evidence determining hate speech. Yet upon reading
several lengthy passages in the opinion, the observer is none the wiser
as to what exactly the court understood ‘song’ to mean. Here are some
examples: ‘[54] Song is a form of verbal art which people use both for
emotional release and also for manipulation of others.’ (Afriforum and
Another: 32) While the court dwells on the ‘emotional release’ part of
song at greater length elsewhere, several paragraphs later the judge
goes into more detail about how precisely song may be used for the
manipulation of others. In a move familiar from debates in which
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cultural contingency is rendered as naturally given, he writes:
[64] The song mutates as and when different people sing it and as and
when the mood or occasion which is celebrated changes…. This is
completely natural and in accordance with the way in which these songs
are used to express the feelings of persons who sing the song (ibid.: 38).

The strategy becomes even more transparent two paragraphs later
where the court expands on the notion of mutation, tracing the origin
of ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ to a recording by one Collins Chabane.
[66] The song sounds very different when Malema sings it to what it
sounds like on the recording of Mr Chabane. When Malema sings
the song, it is quite clearly a chant. Malema sings the first sentence,
the audience sings the chorus. The words are sung in a rhythmic chant
using a staccato. The effect is to produce clipped calls and clipped
responses. When the song is heard on the recording of Mr Chabane,
the song is played legato and sounds much like a gentle lullaby or hymn.
The words remain the same. However, if the words are not understood,
then the song appears innocuous from its tone and delivery (ibid.: 38).

This, the court goes on to state referring to an expert brief by an
unnamed musicologist, is because
historically struggle songs had been developed by persons who
formulated them making use of existing music. Often, for example,
the melody of hymns was used. The person who wrote the song then
adapted the words of the hymn by replacing them with his own words.
A person who heard the singing but did not understand the words
would think that a hymn was being sung if he was familiar with the
tune of the hymn. However, in truth and in fact, the words were
different and conveyed the message of the person who had written
them (ibid.: 39).

Musicologists might cringe at this bumbling foray into South
African musical history. For what Lamont J references here is a tradition
of South African ‘protest song’ that originated in the late colonial era
during the second part of the nineteenth and consisted of two broad
genres: a mournful tradition, exemplified in part by ‘Dubul’ ibhunu,’
rooted in four-part Christian hymnody lamenting the loss of land and
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freedom while simultaneously asserting black South Africans’ humanity
and dignity on the one hand; and a more defiant body of songs based
on indigenous, traditional forms such as ihubo ‘war songs’ on the other
hand (Erlmann 1985).
The ‘chant’ that Malema intoned on the steps of the South Gauteng
High Court, however, is a relatively recent phenomemon having
emerged during the dying days of apartheid as the UDF and, from
1989, scores of former guerilla fighters returning from their camps in
neighboring countries such as Mozambique and Angola performed
it in combination with a type of military drill referred to as toyi-toyi.

Yet musical history apart, there is more to the court’s line of
reasoning than simple ignorance. The court wants to have it both
ways. On the one hand, ‘song’ is construed as the site of unlimited
transformation, going from a lullaby or hymn to ‘rhythmic chant.’
At the same time, however, with the ‘words’ remaining unchanged,
‘songs’ may trick the unsuspecting listener into mistaking their true
essence. Conversely, when in an identical ‘song’ existing texts are
replaced with new lyrics in contrafact-like fashion, the effect on the
judge’s hypothetical listener is the reverse: the ‘song’ retains its original
identity. ‘Song’ is thus hypostatised into something akin to what
Michel Foucault (in a different context) called the ‘author function;’ a
principle that impedes the production, reproduction and proliferation
of meaning. Or, to draw an analogy with Kristeva’s reading of LouisFerdinand Céline, ‘song’ to the Afriforum court is the ‘grammatical’
that prevents language to ‘fly off its handle’ (Kristeva 1982: 189).
Leaving aside the improbability of the vast majority of South Africans
being monolingual, the entire purpose of the court’s reasoning is all
too familiar then. It is to stabilise the ‘verbal’ as the sole repository of
intention by situating ‘song’ within a nexus linking a knowing author
and an ideal, linguistically competent (‘reasonable’) listener capable
of seeing through the machinations of the Malemas of the world in
manipulating ‘song.’
But there might also be an additional layer to the holding. By
referring to Malema’s version as ‘chant’ Lamont may be drawing on
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one of colonial mythology’s most persistent tropes of African musical
aesthetics as somehow being stuck in a pre-historic, pre-’song’ past,
one in which music, unlike that of the ‘civilised’ present, is primarily
thought to be determined by its practical function. ‘Chant,’ then, is more
action than representation or, to put it in Walter Benjamin’s terms, it
is mimesis in its primordial form predating ‘nonsensuous similarity’
(Benjamin 1999). Viewed through this lens, ‘chant’ might provide an
opening for a different and more sono-centric interpretation of the term
‘incitement of imminent violence’ in subsection 1b of s 16 of the South
African Constitution. The Afriforum court might be inadvertently
gesturing toward a notion of ‘song’ as itself constituting incitement
and violence all at once. In other words, as I mentioned earlier what is
at stake in Malema’s performance of ‘Shoot the Boer’ is not the ‘words’
but the performative act itself as exceeding verbally articulated intent.
With the court thus essentially putting the twin concepts of
‘song’ and ‘chant’ up for grabs, it may be useful to ponder the political
consequences of Afriforum v.Malema. The ‘chant’ revived by Malema,
I argue, is one if not the most important contribution he has made
to the political debate, creating a type of political aesthetics hitherto
unknown in post-apartheid South Africa. At a time when political
discourse degenerates into an empty technocratic lingo that justifies the
increasingly draconic means (deregulation, privatisation, surveillance
and government secrecy) that South Africans are being asked to put
up with by pointing to their alleged benefits somewhere down the
line, Malema and his band of Economic Freedom Fighters have taken
blunt talk to a new level. After former South African President Jacob
Zuma had been found to embezzle public funds to upgrade his rural
home with a swimming pool, Malema’s minions regularly disrupted
speeches by government officials with the slogan ‘Pay Back the Money.’

There is a parallel between this twitterisation of politics and the
instrumentalisation of ‘song’ as a mere vehicle of a signified to be
invoked or discarded at will in the attempt of stabilising law’s fragile
authority in distinguishing hate speech from protected expression. As
anthropologist Rosalind Morris views it, these types of intervention
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in and outside of the state-sanctioned public sphere ‘have incited
fantasies of an immediacy that would transcend the pitfalls and the
limits of all forms of mediation, whether political or technological’
(2017: 123). Thus, it is not just that the Afriforum court subscribed to
a profoundly Western, romantic idea in assuming that the meaning
of a song is permanently and unalterably inscribed in the words and
that, hence, authorial intent and work are identical. Nor is it that by
thereby ignoring the possibility that music lives its own deedful life
independent of the doer, the criterion of ‘immediacy’ in some definitions
of incitement to violence risks to become redundant. By overlooking the
massive shifts in popular culture toward quasi-illocutionary practices
in which the boundary between announcement and the announced
deed, between speech and the ‘thing’ spoken about is eroding, the
court blinded itself to the troubling possibility that any form of soundbased communication aspiring to what Morris calls ‘immediacy and
communicative fullness’ given the right target, may constitute hate
speech (2017: 134).
4
Soon after the court handed down its decision that Malema had violated
the hate speech provisions of the Equality Act, the parties entered into
a mediation agreement in which Malema and the ANC (the second
respondent) acknowledged that some words in certain ‘struggle songs’
go directly against ‘morality of society’ and are hurtful to minority
groups. Yet fast forward several more years and ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ is alive
and well. On May 17, 2017 the Broadcasting Complaints Commission
of South Africa heard complaints of hate speech and incitement to
violence submitted by a large group of viewers of the wildly popular
soap titled Isidingo (The Need) (BCCSA, 11/2017, van Wyk and several
others v. SABC3). In one of the episodes of the series one of the main
characters of the show, allegorically named Sechaba (‘Nation’), visits
the grave of his father located on a farm owned by Afrikaners. (Black
farm laborers were commonly buried on the farm they had been
working on for their entire lives.) There, Sechaba is confronted by two
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farmers who, after having hurled racial abuse at him, brutally assault
him and, rather than shooting him, bury him alive. While Sechaba
survives the ordeal, the community of farm laborers, armed with clubs,
assegais and torches, and singing ‘Dubul’ ibhunu,’ stage a march to a
hotel where the two farmers are hiding out, demanding that they come
out, presumably to face imminent death at the hands of the angry mob.

Hearings of the BCCSA tribunal are designed to give complainants
an opportunity to engage with representatives of the responding
broadcaster directly and for the commissioners to come to a decision
about the complaint in terms of the industry’s self-elected code
of conduct. Over the years the tribunal has heard around a dozen
complaints about hate speech and incitement to violence, most
notoriously the ‘AmaNdiya’ case in which the South African Human
Rights commission argued that famed dramatist-songwriter Mbongeni
Ngema’s song ‘AmaNdiya’ (Indians) amounted to hate speech against
South Africans of Indian descent (BCCSA, 31/2002, SAHRC v. SABC),
and more recently, the case of ‘Get Out,’ a hip hop track featuring
lyrics calling for ‘people fight’ and the ‘oppressor get out,’ all to the
accompaniment of machine gun sounds (BCCSA 05/2008, W Spies
v SABC1).7 In the May 17 tribunal the commissioners reviewed a
selection of the 110 or so written complaints they had received about the
farm episode, followed by a screening of the allegedly offending scenes
and by testimony given by one of the complainants and a senior official
of the South African Broadcasting Service (SABC) that produces and
airs Isidingo. Most complaints were by whites that took issue with the
way, as one Michael Coetzee put it for example, the show ‘opened
wounds, caused unnecessary hurt and pain and portrays white people
(particularly farmers) as racists.’ Viewer Deon Fialkov, for his part,
reiterating a comment he had posted earlier on Facebook, argued that
the show ‘is only showing racism by white people’ and that ‘it doesn’t
seem right that only one race is made out to be racist when racism
affects every race.’8 In response, the SABC spokesperson defended
the story as ‘intended to address an important and complex part of
our history and the present-day South Africa,’ in hopes of speaking to
‘the preconceived notions and stereotypes on both sides of the colour
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divide that still needs to be addressed in order for the country to find
healing. Its intent is to open a continuing dialogue on the issue of race
to the benefit of all South Africans and our collective future.’

Predictably, after brief deliberation, the commission found that the
scenes in question did not contravene either clause 4(1) of the Code of
Conduct that prohibits the sanctioning or promotion of violence based
inter alia on race or clause 4(2) that prohibits hate speech. Rather more
startling, however, is the fact that at no point either during or after
oral arguments did it occur to the commissioners that the singing of
‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ in the hotel scene (a clip of which was also shown)
might provide additional evidence of the hate allegedly being advocated
in the episode. In fact, the acoustic dimension of both the graveyard
and the hotel scenes was ignored altogether.
5
One may speculate about the tribunal’s deafness vis-à-vis a soundtrack
so sparse that one cannot but notice the stark contrast between the
serenity of the graveyard scene and the raucous atmosphere in the
hotel lobby. In the former the faint traffic noise, chirping birds, the
sound of Sechaba shaking a snuff box and clearing the grave from the
overgrowth of grass, and most importantly, the drone-like choral chord
that accompanies Sechaba’s appeal for forgiveness from his father, like
a sonic halo transfigures the scene into a quasi-religious moment of
atonement, not unlike the post-apartheid project of nation-building
in the name of democracy, ubuntu (human dignity) and reconciliation.
In contrast, the hotel scene is dominated by the ‘noise’ of ‘Dubula’
drowning out the carefully balanced sonosphere by the grave.
In closing, I would like to expand on the hotel scene with a view
to highlight the ability of techniques of resignification to disrupt law’s
desire to be itself by undermining sound’s expediency, and concurrent
with it, to perpetuate the abrogation of political or legal mediation at the
heart of the politics of hate.9 One notices several sonic and visual layers
being skillfully superimposed on each other. Thus, when the mob enters
the lobby demanding that the two farmers be handed over to them,
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the song is no longer the much maligned ‘Dubul ’ibhunu;’ the crowd
only intones the refrain ‘Dubula,’ other lines of the lyrics remaining
indistinct in the background. And just in case any unsuspecting viewers
might be unfamiliar with the meaning of the Zulu word ‘dubula’ or,
might be irked by uncomfortable echoes of Malema’s ‘disciplined’
performance of ‘Dubula’ several years prior, the subtitle makes it clear
that what they are hearing is not an ‘incitement to cause harm’ but
merely a form of ‘protest.’ But only a moment later, as the frame shifts
from the action filling the entire screen to something approximating
what in literature and art is known as polyfocality, this attempt at
cleansing the phrase from its violent connotation takes a sudden turn
into more ambivalent terrain. An employee or guest of the hotel, in a
kind of alienation effect, is seen taking a video of the events on his cell
phone, only to be reprimanded by one of the intruders: ‘Hey, shove off.
You think this is a movie?’
Several readings of this shot suggest themselves. On the one hand,
by making itself the object of the narrative through the ‘movie in the
movie’ frame, the scene might be said to invite its viewers to take at
face value the producer’s declared objective of laying bare ‘preconceived
notions and stereotypes.’ In other words, by redirecting the audience’s
gaze from the ‘actual’ performance of the song to a ‘movie’ of the song
as taken and viewed by the owner of the cell phone, the scene insinuates
that what the viewers are seeing is not an incitement to cause harm
but a movie indeed and therefore open to interpretation. On the other
hand, despite placing the spectator in an active, self-reflexive position
the shot may also achieve the exact opposite of such critical media
consumption: the possibility, namely, that real-life performances of
‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ are indeed ‘movies.’ This is of course a bold claim. Yet,
without wanting to minimise the legitimacy of expressions of anger in
the face of racist abuse and racially motivated violence, the theatricality
of such expressions is hard to overlook. Just as Malema had shrewdly
sanitised ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ into mere wordplay by ‘resignifying’ its lyrics
from ‘Kill the Boer’ to ‘Kiss the Boer,’ the aestheticisation of political
dissent is part and parcel of what Morris calls the ‘ob-scenity’ of a
type of political intervention that deliberately positions itself outside
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or ‘off-scene’ the norms of reasoned discourse (Morris 2017: 128). But
at the same time this flouting of the protocols of liberal democracy
depends on them for its efficacy in creating the echo chamber of
populist politics. Because constitutional encroachments on the freedom
of expression always carry within themselves the barely concealed
threat of force (alluded to in Zapiro’s cartoon above), at the hands of
populist politicians such as Malema songs like ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ are
meant to goad the state into revealing its true repressive nature, and in
turn forge a visceral sense of shared identity among those imagining
themselves as standing in opposition to the state and its institutions.
Sound, Morris recognises (albeit by using the word ‘song’), is crucial
in this process. By uttering and repeating stripped-down phrases such
as ‘Dubula,’ she argues, anyone can ‘find themselves enthralled by the
strange sensation of speaking someone else’s words and simultaneously
experiencing them as one’s own’ (ibid: 128). Sound, then, in its barest,
virtually a-semantic form thus has the primary function and capacity
to mediate (in the Actor-Network Theory sense of the word) the act
of communication itself; to assemble words, meaning, and action into
an alternate, movie-like reality taken for politics.
Endnotes
1. For further criticism see Barendt 2019 and Sorial 2012: 79-80.

2. See also Chow-Steintrager 2019, Daughtry 2015, Eidsheim 2015, Hainge
2013.

3. For another critique of ‘vibration’ as a cultural trope or ‘cosmograph’ see
Kahn 2020.
4. For a detailed analysis of the ‘hostile intent’ doctrine in the context of the
trial see Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law 1985.

5. See also Buitendag-van Merle 2014. See also the discussion in van der
Merwe 2013 of African National Congress v Harmse: In Re Harmse v Vawda
(Afriforum Intervening) 2011 5 SA 460 (GSJ) in which the High Court
held that ‘the publication and chanting of the words Dubula ibhunu prima
facie satisfies the crime of incitement to commit murder.’ Van der Merve
even goes as far as declaring: ‘One would indeed be hard pressed to deny
a measure of similarity between the song ‘Dubula Ibhunu ‘ and the song
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‘Tubatsembesembe ‘ (‘We will kill them all’), which was sung by Hutu
extremists prior to the Rwandan genocide.’ (351)

6. See for instance the special issue on ‘Conquest, Constitutionalism and
Democratic Contestations’ in the South African Journal on Human Rights
34, 2018.

7. Another case, pending with the Human Rights Commission, is the music
video ‘Larney Jou Poes’ by hip hop crew Dookoom, in which rapper Isaac
Mutant exhorts a group of back farmworkers brandishing guns and forks
to burn down the white farmer’s farm.

8. Quoted from emails received by BCCSA. I am grateful to BCCSA
secretary Shouneez Martin for providing me with copies of these emails.

9. A similar dynamic may be at work in the music of hip-hop/rave group Die
Antwoord and the critical reception videos such as ‘Fatty Boom Boom’
experienced (Haupt 2012).
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